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Abstract 
 
A general theory is developed to analyze the efficiency and income distribution effects of a 
biofuel consumer tax exemption and the interaction effects with a price contingent farm subsidy. 
Using U.S. policy as an example, ethanol prices rise above the gasoline price by the amount of 
the tax credit. Corn farmers therefore gain directly while gasoline consumers only gain from any 
reduction in world oil prices due to the extra ethanol production. Domestic oil producers lose. 
Because increased ethanol production improves the terms of trade in both the export of corn and 
the import of oil, we determine the optimal tax credit and the conditions affecting it.  
 
Historically, the intercept of the ethanol supply curve is above the gasoline price. Hence, part of 
the tax credit is redundant and represents ‘rectangular’ deadweight costs that dwarf standard 
triangular deadweight cost measures of traditional farm subsidies. We show under what 
conditions corn subsidies can eliminate, create, have no effect or have an ambiguous effect on 
rectangular deadweight costs. There are situations where corn subsidies have been the sole cause 
of ethanol production (and therefore of rectangular deadweight costs), even with the tax credit.  
Corn producers do not benefit from a tax credit when the subsidy program is in effect.  
 
Proponents of ethanol argue that the tax credit reduces tax costs of farm subsidies. But this 
ignores rectangular deadweight costs. To assess this, we calibrate a stylized empirical model of 
the U.S. corn market and determine that total rectangular deadweight costs averaged $1,520 mil. 
from 2001-2006. Over 25 percent of this is due to the farm subsidy program which also 
increased the tax costs of the tax credit by 50 percent.  Furthermore, the tax credit itself doubles 
the deadweight costs of the corn production subsidies. Ethanol policies can therefore not be 
justified on the grounds of mitigating the effects of farm subsidy programs.  
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The Welfare Economics of an Excise-Tax Exemption for Biofuels and the Interaction 
Effects with Farm Subsidies 
 
1. Introduction 
Biofuels have generated a great deal of interest worldwide as a solution to a host of 
problems, ranging from reducing dependency on oil and tax costs of farm programs to improving 
farm incomes and environmental quality (Miranowski 2007; Zilberman 2007). Ambitious goals 
on the use of biofuels are being set in many countries, including developing countries (Jank et al. 
2007; Kojima and Johnson 2006, Rajagopal and Zilberman 2007). In addition to grants, 
guaranteed loans and tax incentives for the production of biofuels, many governments exempt 
biofuels from consumer excise taxes to help achieve targets on biofuel use.1 Along with high oil 
prices, the tax exemption for ethanol facilitated the increase in demand for agricultural 
commodities in U.S. biofuel production (Tyner 2007).2 Although ethanol accounted for only 4 
percent of transportation fuel consumption and 20 percent of total corn use in 2006, the rapidly 
expanding production of ethanol has resulted in sharp increases in the price of corn. As well, the 
increase in resources devoted to corn production has pushed up prices of other commodities that 
compete with corn for land, are substitutes in demand for corn or use corn as an input (Elobeid et 
al. 2007). This has a direct adverse effect on the users of these crops, including livestock 
industries and consumers in developing countries (Runge and Senauer 2007). Meanwhile, 
increased market prices reduced the tax costs of price contingent farm subsidies.  
This paper develops a prototype welfare theoretic framework to analyze the efficiency 
and income distribution effects of a biofuel consumption tax credit and the interaction effects 
with price contingent production subsidies. We analyze the U.S. ethanol tax credit and loan 
deficiency payments as a stylized example to empirically illustrate the implications of the model.  
As shown in de Gorter and Just (2008), the tax credit provides an incentive for refiners and 
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blenders to bid up the price of ethanol above that gasoline by the amount of the tax. We show in 
this paper that gasoline consumers only gain from the reduction in world oil prices due to the 
extra ethanol production while domestic oil producers lose. Because increased ethanol 
production improves the terms of trade in both the export of corn and the import of oil, we 
determine the optimal tax credit and the conditions affecting it.3 
Although one bushel of corn produces 2.8 gallons of ethanol, de Gorter and Just (2008) 
show that if the value of by-products is taken into account, a tax credit of 51¢/gal translates into 
approximately a $2.04/bu increase in the corn price. Except in times of very high oil prices, the 
intercept of the ethanol supply curve is above the market price of ethanol that would occur 
without the tax credit. This means a significant part of the tax credit can be redundant. This 
‘water’ in the tax credit generates ‘rectangular’ deadweight costs, defined as that part of the cost 
of the tax credit that is not a transfer to corn producers. Therefore, any terms of trade 
improvements in the export of corn and import of oil can easily be eliminated. 
Using a stylized empirical model of the U.S. corn market to illustrate the potential 
welfare effects of a tax credit, we find that rectangular deadweight costs averaged $1,520 mil. 
from 2001 to 2006.4 The tax costs of the tax credit averaged $1,914 mil. This means that over 75 
percent of the tax costs due to the tax credit were rectangular deadweight costs. Although the tax 
credit reduces taxpayer costs of price contingent farm subsidies, tax savings in farm subsidies are 
replaced by increases in costs to corn consumers and by increases in the tax costs of the tax 
credit due to the loan rate. Meanwhile, the tax credit increases the deadweight costs of the loan 
rate program.   
In theory, the effect of the loan rate on rectangular deadweight costs are to both increase 
and decrease it (net effect is ambiguous), to eliminate it, to create it, or to have no impact at all. 
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The outcome depends on whether the market price of corn is above or below the price that would 
prevail without ethanol production, and on whether there is water in the tax credit with the loan 
rate. Empirically, we find that one-third of rectangular deadweight costs of the tax credit is due 
to the loan rate. But there are situations where ethanol production occurs only because of price 
supports.    
This paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the general theoretical 
model while Section 3 analyzes the interaction effects between the tax credit and price supports.  
Section 4 presents an algebraic formulation of the general theory while Section 5 presents the 
empirical results. The last section provides some concluding remarks. 
2. Theoretical Model 
We assume constant returns to scale in ethanol production.5 The price premium for 
ethanol over gasoline sometimes exceeds the tax credit due to the additive value of ethanol as an 
oxygenate and octane enhancer Tyner (2007). This additive value is assumed to be fixed in our 
model and is normalized to zero.6 We also assume ethanol imports to be exogenous as 
international trade in biofuels has been small (Howse et al. 2006).7  Except for episodes of very 
high U.S. ethanol prices, most imports into the United States normally come through a 
preferential trading arrangement with Caribbean countries and are limited by an import quota.  
Denote the U.S. corn supply curve by SC and total non-ethanol demand for corn by DNE 
(Figure 1).8 Their intersection determines the price of corn PNE that occurs with no ethanol 
production. The excess supply of corn for ethanol production SE is given in panel (b) of Figure 1.  
Denote Sd as the domestic supply curve for gasoline. This along with the import supply curve 
generates a total gasoline supply curve SF. Since the intercept of the ethanol supply curve is 
assumed to be above the price of gasoline PG, the supply curve SF is of gasoline only. The 
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intersection with the domestic demand for fuel DF solves for PG, the market price of gasoline.9  
In this situation, the corn price PC equals PNE and is not related to oil prices.                        
 Define tc as the 51¢ gal tax credit to refiners for using ethanol with gasoline.10 As 
described in de Gorter and Just (2008), competition among refiners will ensure that the market 
price of ethanol will rise and equal PG + tc. One can depict this as a downward shift in the supply 
curve for ethanol by tc to S'E. The new fuel supply curve becomes S'F such that domestic oil 
production and imports fall to OG and GH, respectively. The new level of fuel (ethanol and 
gasoline) consumption is OJ, resulting in gasoline and corn prices of P'G and PC, respectively.  
The corn price is now equal to the gasoline price plus the tax credit. As derived in de Gorter and 
Just (2008), to transform a variable from ¢/gal into $/bu, one multiplies a variable expressed in 
¢/gal by β/(1-δ) where β is the gallons of ethanol produced from one bushel of corn and δ is the 
proportion of the value of corn returned to the market in the form of by-products. This means the 
tax credit is approximately $2.04 per bushel.11  
Gasoline consumers only gain from the consumption tax credit through the reduction in 
world oil prices due to the extra ethanol production. The tax credit raises the price to corn 
producers and non-ethanol corn consumers (an equal production subsidy and consumption tax) 
by PC – PNE, which is less than the tax credit tcb (expressed in $/bu) because of possible water in 
the tax credit equal to the initial level of water PNE - PGb (the difference between the intercept of 
the ethanol supply curve and initial price of gasoline expressed in $/bu) plus the reduction in fuel 
prices due to ethanol production (PGb - P'Gb). The tax credit therefore reduces gasoline use by the 
distance HI in Figure 1 and increases fuel consumption by IJ.   
Non-ethanol consumers of corn transfer area a to corn producers while taxpayers transfer 
area b + c + d plus the hatched and cross-hatched areas.12 The hatched area represents net 
 6
rectangular deadweight costs of the tax credit while the cross-hatched area represents that part of 
rectangular deadweight costs that are the transferred from taxpayers to fuel consumers due to the 
decline in fuel prices resulting from increased ethanol production. Corn producer surplus 
increases by area a + b + c and the deadweight costs of overproduction is given by area d. 
Water in the tax credit varies year to year as it depends critically on both PNE (market 
conditions in the corn market) and the price of gasoline (market conditions in the oil market).  
For example, a large increase in the price of oil will reduce water in the tax credit and may even 
eliminate it. If so, the rectangular deadweight costs disappear and become part of the transfer to 
corn farmers. Denote w as the water in the tax credit: w = PNE – P'Gb. If oil prices are low 
enough, water can equal the entire tax credit. Note also that w = tcb – (PC – PNE) – (PGb – P'Gb). 
Oil prices have to increase by more than the water, w, before all water in the tax credit tcb is 
squeezed out.  
Figure 2 presents a more detailed explanation of the various costs and benefits of the tax 
credit. Panel (a) shows domestic oil production to be OG, oil imports to be GH and ethanol 
consumption to be HJ (letters corresponding to that in Figure 1). Domestic oil producers lose 
producer surplus of area e + f  while the international terms of trade improvement in oil imports 
is area f + g + h.13 The terms of trade improvement from increased ethanol production in oil 
prices is captured by domestic consumers and is given by area i + j + k (corresponding to the 
cross hatched area in panel (a) of Figure 1). The gain by domestic gasoline consumers from 
taxpayers is due to the international terms of trade effect for oil. The gain in consumer surplus is 
the sum of all areas denoted in panel (a) of Figure 2 less area k (the deadweight costs of over-
consumption) while the international gains from trade in the oil market is offset by area f (the 
deadweight costs of underproduction of domestic oil). 
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The detailed breakdown of welfare effects in the corn market is depicted in panel (b) of 
Figure 2. Denote the domestic demand for non-ethanol corn by Dd. The transfer to corn 
producers from domestic non-ethanol corn consumers is area l while transfers from importers of 
U.S. corn is area n + q.14 Deadweight costs of under-consumption is given by area n. The cross 
hatched area is identical to that in the first panel of Figure 1 and represents the transfer of 
taxpayer funds to consumers of gasoline because of increased ethanol production induced by the 
tax credit that displaces gasoline consumption. Corn producers only get the full benefit of the tax 
credit tc if the price of oil is fixed and there is no water in the tax credit. There are four 
deadweight cost triangles (areas f and k in Figure 2a; area n in Figure 2b and area d in Figure 1a).  
Net U.S. social welfare can be positive with a tax credit because of these two international terms 
of trade improvements. The U.S. import tariff on ethanol may also improve their terms of trade 
in world ethanol markets. Adding a foreign excess supply curve of ethanol to the model would 
allow one to analyze this. Finally, there may be more net social gains if we include the effects of 
the tax credit subsidy in reducing price contingent subsidies for corn. We take this issue up in the 
next section.  
3. Interaction Effects between a Tax Credit and Price Contingent Farm Subsidies 
There are two particularly important issues to analyze: the impact of the tax credit on 
both the tax costs and deadweight costs of the loan rate program, and vice-versa, particularly 
how the loan rate impacts rectangular deadweight costs due to the tax credit. The analysis 
assumes oil prices are exogenous so the market price for corn PC is determined by the price of 
gasoline plus the tax credit.15 
Consider first the case in Figure 3 where the observed market price for corn PC is above 
PNE, the corn price with no ethanol production. If the tax credit is the only policy in effect, then 
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the taxpayer costs are tcb·(QC – CNE) where QC is production with the tax credit only and CNE is 
non-ethanol corn consumption. If the loan rate is the only policy in place, then the tax costs are 
(L – PL)·QL where L is the loan rate (guaranteed price to producers), QL is corn production with 
the loan rate and PL is the market price of corn without the tax credit. Tax costs with both the tax 
credit tcb and loan rate are L,  
(1) (L – PC)·QL + tcb ·(QL – CNE) 
The loan rate in this case (Figure 3) has no impact on non-ethanol corn consumption. The first 
term of equation (1) denotes the tax costs of the deficiency payments independent of the tax 
credit. We therefore focus on the second term. We know that tcb can be expressed as, 
(2) tcb = PC – PGb = (PC – PL) + (PL – PGb) 
Therefore, the gross tax savings of deficiency payments due to the tax credit is given by, 
(3) (PC – MAX[PL, PGb])·QL 
Let us consider the case of Figure 3 where PL > PGb. The components of QL in equation (3) are 
given by, 
(4) QL = CNE + (QC – CNE) + (QL – QC) 
Using each of the right hand terms of (4) with (3), we can breakdown the different components 
of the tax savings in deficiency payments due to the tax credit. To begin, part of the tax savings 
represents increased costs to consumers of corn (both domestic and foreign), 
(5) (PC – PL)·CNE 
Another part of the tax costs of the tax credit that otherwise would have been part of the tax costs 
of the loan rate but is independent of the deficiency payment program is given by, 
(6) (PC – PL)·(QC – CNE) 
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The tax costs in equation (6) cancels with what otherwise would have been deficiency payments 
(area a + c in Figure 3). 
On the other hand, part of the tax costs of the tax credit are due to the deficiency 
program, given by (PC – PGb)·(QL – QC). For now, let us focus only on that part of the loan rate’s 
contribution to the tax costs of the tax credit which cancels with the reduction in tax costs of the 
loan rate due to the tax credit, namely area b + d in Figure 3: 
(7) (PC – PL)·(QL – QC) 
The increased costs in equations (5) – (7) exactly cancel the reductions in the tax costs of the 
deficiency payment program due to the tax credit given by equation (3). However, there are tax 
costs of the tax credit yet unaccounted for that are above and beyond the tax savings in 
deficiency payments. These are the tax costs that represent rectangular deadweight costs and are 
given by area e + f in Figure 3: 
(8) (PL – PGb)·(QL – CNE) 
Define water in the presence of the loan rate as wL = PL – PGb which is always less than the water 
without a loan rate w = PNE – PGb. Because of the water, the area e + f in Figure 3 represents that 
part of the tax costs of the tax credit that are deadweight costs. The second term in parentheses of 
equation (8) can be re-written as, 
(9) QL – CNE = (QC – CNE) + (QL – QC) 
Using each term in (9) and combining with (8), we can therefore identify two components of the 
extra tax costs due to the tax credit that are beyond the savings in tax costs of deficiency 
payments due to the tax credit. The first of these is the rectangular deadweight cost of the tax 
credit regardless of deficiency payments (area e), 
(10) wL·(QC – CNE) 
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followed by the rectangular deadweight costs of the tax credit due to the deficiency payment 
program (area f), 
(11) wL·(QL – QC) 
To summarize, the tax savings of the deficiency payment program in equation (3) are 
offset by increased consumer costs and tax costs of the tax credit policy given in equations (5) – 
(7) that exclude the additional rectangular deadweight costs described in equations (10) – (11).  
This is only relevant for the case in Figure 3. Nevertheless, part of the increased consumer costs 
in equation (5) is to foreign importers of U.S. corn exports, thereby increasing the U.S. 
international terms of trade in corn export markets. These terms of trade gains can more than 
offset the additional rectangular deadweight costs, depending on market parameters. We discuss 
this further in the empirical section later. 
The net savings in total taxpayer costs due to the tax credit is ambiguous in theory and 
depends on the relative size of (PC – PL)·CNE versus wL·(QL – CNE). Given that the share of corn 
used in ethanol production is historically much lower than all other uses of corn, it is likely that 
the tax credit results in a net savings in tax costs. This may change in the future however as 
ethanol production increases along with market prices of corn. Nevertheless, we will show later 
in the empirical section that the benefits of the reduced tax costs are more than offset by higher 
prices to consumers and rectangular deadweight costs.  
So far we have shown that part of the existing rectangular deadweight costs is due to 
deficiency payments.  Let us now examine the effect of the deficiency payments on rectangular 
deadweight costs in general. The loan rate expands output by QL – QC.  The rectangular 
deadweight costs with the tax credit tcb only are area c + e in Figure 3: 
w·(QC – CNE) 
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The rectangular deadweight costs with both the tax credit tcb and loan rate L is area e + f: 
wL·(QL – CNE) 
Hence, the effect of the loan rate on rectangular deadweight costs is to increase it by area f 
[wL·(QL – QC)] and decrease it by area c [(PNE – PL)(QC – CNE)].  The net effect of the loan rate 
on rectangular deadweight costs is therefore ambiguous. 
An exogenous increase in the price of oil will reduce water and increase market price for 
corn, with the reduced non-ethanol corn consumption diverted to ethanol use. A decrease in the 
tax credit has exactly the opposite effect.  Note that the effects of these exogenous changes in the 
oil price and tax credit are the same for each of the cases examined in Figures 3-4. 
However, the analysis so far assumes water with the loan rate is positive ex ante and ex 
post.  There is a possible case where the initial water, w = PNE – PGb, is eliminated with the 
introduction of the loan rate so the loan rate unambiguously reduces rectangular deadweight 
costs in this situation. Otherwise, the analysis above in equations (1)–(7) still holds for this case 
where the initial water is eliminated with the loan rate. 
The analysis so far in Figure 3 assumes positive ethanol production with no loan rate.  
However, this may not be the case as it is possible that the market price of corn PC is less than 
PNE  as shown in Figure 4.16  Rectangular deadweight costs before the introduction of the loan 
rate is zero because water in the tax credit is 100 percent and so there is no ethanol production.  
After the introduction of the loan rate, the rectangular deadweight costs are wL·(QL – CNE).  
Hence, the loan rate creates rectangular deadweight costs in this case. When the price of corn is 
below PNE, then ethanol production is due to the loan rate. Without a loan rate, there would be no 
ethanol production even with a tax credit. The loan rate not only increases rectangular 
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deadweight costs, it can be the sole cause of it. Not only is water greater than the tax credit, de 
Gorter and Just (2008) show that it is often greater than the price of corn. 
Although not shown in Figure 4, there is a possible case where PGB is greater than PL. In 
this case, there are no rectangular deadweight costs so the loan rate has no impact on rectangular 
deadweight costs.   
In summary, the tax credit decreases tax costs of the loan rate but the latter increases the 
tax costs of the tax credit. The net effect on tax costs is ambiguous a priori. Nevertheless, the tax 
credit increases consumer costs and incurs rectangular deadweight costs. In theory, the effect of 
the loan rate on rectangular deadweight costs are to both increase and decrease it (net effect is 
ambiguous), to eliminate it, to create it, or to have no impact at all. The outcome strictly depends 
on which of the four possible initial equilibriums discussed in Figures 3 and 4. Thus it is vital to 
understand the prevailing equilibrium if one is to assess the welfare effects of the tax credit.   
4. An Algebraic Formulation of the Welfare Effects of the Tax Credit  
Because the tax credit for ethanol can have such disparate effects on welfare and trade, 
we derive the optimal tax credit for a large country exporter of corn and importer of oil for each 
of the situations described in Figures 1-4. This serves as an important benchmark to understand 
how different market parameters determine the social welfare effects of the tax credit policy. 
Consider a demand sector represented by the indirect utility function ( ),V P Y , where P is 
the vector of prices and Y the level of income. This indirect utility function generates the demand 
curve for corn,
1
D
P Yq V V= − , and for fuel 2DF P Yq V V= − . The supply sector can be represented 
by ( )Pπ  generating the supply curve for corn, 1Sq π= − , where the subscript 1 denotes the 
derivative of the first element of P. Likewise, the supply curve for gasoline is given by 
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2
S
Gq π= − . Additionally, let the foreign demand for corn be given by ( )X Xq q P= and the import 
supply of gasoline given by XGq . Denote the tax credit given to ethanol producers as cbt , 
thus 'c c cbP P t= + . The optimal cbt  solves 
(12) ( )max ,
cb
gt
V P P Y⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦%  
subject to 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )0 ˆ ˆ,S D X Scb cY Y t q P q P q P q P Pθ π= − − − − +% % , 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )ˆS X DS D XG c G c F cq P q P q P q P q P q P+ + − − =% % , 
where { }ˆ max , ,c cb NEP P t P L= +  is the producer price for corn, ( )( ){ }1 1 ˆmax , Dc cbP P t q Pπ−= + −%  
is the consumer price for corn, { }max ,0L Pθ = − %  is the deficiency payment. The variable NEP  is 
defined implicitly as ( ) ( ) ( )S D XNE NE NEq P q P q P= + , L  is the loan rate, and ( )1 .Dq−  is the 
inverse of the demand function for corn consumption.  
Let iη  be the price elasticity of curve i. Define the elasticity of excess supply of ethanol 
by 1
S D
S D X
X X
q q
q q
κ η η η= − − ,  the elasticity of excess demand for ethanol as 
2
S X
D S XG G
F G GD D
F F
q q
q q
κ η η η= − −  and define 3 1
S
S
X
q
q
κ κ η= − . The corn devoted to ethanol is defined by 
S D XE q q q= − −  and the excess demand for imported gasoline and domestic ethanol fuel is 
given by SDF GM q q= − . Solving the optimization conditions for (12) (see the appendix for a 
complete proof), we find: 
(i) if L NEP P L> > , then  
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( ) ( ) 1 11 2 1 21 if 1 (CASE A)1 1
0 otherwise (CASE B)
c NE
D D
F F c
cb
P PE ME M
q q P
t
κ κ
κ κ κ κ
⎧ ⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤−− + + >⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦⎪⎪= ⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
 
(ii) if NE LL P P> > , then  
(iii) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 2 1 2
3 3
3
3 2 3 2
1 if 1 (CASE A)
1 1
11 if 2 (CASE C1)
1 1
0 otherwise (CASE C2)
c
D D
F F c
cb c L
D D
F c F c
P E M LE M
q q P
t P PLE M E M
q P q P
κ κ
κ κ κ κ
κ κ κκ κ κ κ
⎧ ⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤−− + + >⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦⎪⎪⎪⎪= ⎨ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + > − + + >⎪ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
The formula defines the parameters that will minimize areas a and d in Figure 1a and area n 
in Figure 2b while at the same time maximize the area q. If the oil price is exogenous, then 
2κ  is infinite, leaving only the last term in each case. When the loan rate is not operational 
(as in CASE A above) the optimal tax credit is then given by ( )1 1CP κ − . The more inelastic 
the domestic supply and non-ethanol demand (domestic and foreign) curves are, the higher 
the optimal tax credit or equivalently, the lower the social costs of the tax credit.  In this case, 
the tax credit has a relatively smaller impact on the amount of corn used for non-ethanol 
consumption, thus reducing the incidence of the tax. In addition, the higher the share of corn 
exports relative to supply (weighted by the supply elasticity) and relative to domestic demand 
(weighted by the domestic non-ethanol demand elasticity), the lower the social cost of the tax 
credit. In this case corn importers carry the brunt of the corn price increase, the added 
revenue to domestic producers outweighing the loss to domestic consumers.  
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 Because we assume the oil market absorbs all ethanol at a fixed world oil price, the 
elasticity of demand for ethanol is not a factor. If the loan rate is operational (CASE C1), then 
the social cost of the tax credit will no longer depend on the supply of corn as this is fixed at the 
loan rate. The optimal tax will now only depend on the properties of the domestic and foreign 
demand for corn, 3κ . 
When oil prices are endogenous, then the results are conditioned by ( )E M− − , or the 
amount of fuel from foreign oil producers, and 21 κκ , the ratio of the elasticities of excess supply 
and demand of ethanol.  The higher the imports of oil, the lower the social cost of the tax credit. 
In this case, the tax credit allows fuel consumption to substitute ethanol for imported oil, 
potentially improving the terms of trade (both lowering the imported oil price and raising the 
corn price for exports). Additionally, the more negative the ratio of elasticities of excess supply 
and demand for ethanol, the lower the social cost of a tax credit. While the tax credit raises the 
corn price, the higher elasticity of supply suggests that corn producers can increase production to 
take advantage of the better terms of trade. Alternatively, the lower (less negative) elasticity of 
demand for ethanol suggests that domestic consumers of fuel do not adjust their ethanol 
consumption very much, given the price decrease in fuel. Thus the tax credit will more directly 
improve the international terms of trade. Table 1 summarizes these results for each of the 
possible price contingencies described in Figures 1-4 that could affect the social welfare effects 
of the tax credit.   
5. An Empirical Illustration 
The basic market parameters calibrated and derived for the U.S. corn market are 
summarized in Table 2. Annual data are presented for the crop years 2001/02 to 2006/07 for 
which the simulations were undertaken. Data were obtained from the United States Department 
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of Agriculture (USDA). The supply and demand curves were calibrated assuming a constant 
elasticity of 0.4, -0.2 and -1.0 for corn supply, domestic demand and export demand, 
respectively. An estimate of the corn price without ethanol production PNE is first required to 
determine water in the tax credit (with and without the loan rate). Water is found to be positive in 
each year. Note that the average water in the tax credit was $1.87/bu and $1.67/bu when 
including the effects of the loan rate. Because of water in the tax credit, the average increase in 
the market price of corn was $0.21/bu due to the tax credit, far less than the implied subsidy of 
$2.04/bu. In other words, the average difference between PC and PNE was 21¢/bu. 
The first three columns in Table 3 show the various sources of deadweight costs with the 
deadweight cost triangle averaging $186 mil. and $18 mil. due to overproduction and 
underconsumption of corn, respectively. However, rectangular deadweight costs averaged 
$1,520 mil. (column [3]), significantly higher than if there was no loan rate ($1,103 mil. in 
column [4]).17 The values of column [3] represent are e + f in Figure 3 while column [4] 
represents area e (the difference being area f). Recall in the theory section earlier that the loan 
rate has an ambiguous impact on rectangular deadweight costs, depending on the value of area f 
versus area c in Figure 3. In 2003/04, area c was greater than area f, implying rectangular 
deadweight costs were lower with the loan rate in that year but the opposite was the case for all 
other years. The loan rate increased annual rectangular deadweight costs on average by $417 mil. 
(column [3] minus column [4]). 
Average total tax costs were $3,331 mil. while average transfers from domestic and 
foreign consumers to corn producers were $1,484 and $433 mil., respectively. Net social welfare 
was negative in every year, averaging -$1,291 mil. (column [11]). Therefore, the improvement in 
the international terms of trade for corn exports (averaging $433 mil. per year) was more than 
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offset by rectangular deadweight costs in each year (averaging $1,520 mil. per year). 
Additionally, the net social costs varied significantly, as it depends on the level of oil prices and 
the level of PNE (which depends on supply and demand shifts in the non-ethanol corn market). 
If there were no loan rate program, then the social costs of the tax credit average $913 
mil. (column [12]), significantly lower than before of $1,291 mil. This represents the increase in 
total deadweight costs because of the loan rate.  
The final column of Table 3 shows that the net social costs of the loan rate program 
without the tax credit is $613 mil., more than if both polices were in place ($1,291 mil). This 
means the tax credit increases the deadweight costs of the loan rate program, even though the tax 
credit improves the international terms of trade improvement by $921 mil. per year (column [8] 
minus column [9]).18 There are other costs of the ethanol tax credit not accounted for like the 
general equilibrium effects of a spike in food prices increasing the inefficiency of taxes on labor 
(Goulder and Williams 2003). The empirical simulation presented here is only meant to illustrate 
the properties of the theoretical model for a single sector and its interaction effect with a price 
contingent farm subsidy. 
If only the tax credit was in place, then total taxpayer costs would have averaged $1,914 
mil. (second to last column in Table 2), implying the loan rate increased the annual tax costs of 
the tax credit by an average of $526 mil.19  Meanwhile, the tax credit reduced the average annual 
tax costs of deficiency payments, resulting in a net savings of $2,092 mil. in tax costs. But 
rectangular deadweight costs of the tax credit average about $1,520 mil. and increased costs to 
domestic consumers are $1,484 mil. Furthermore, average total tax costs are $3,331 (column [5] 
in table 3) but would average $3,508 is there was no tax credit. Therefore, the total reduction in 
annual tax costs with the tax credit is only $177 mil. 
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Another caveat of the analysis is the assumption that the loan rate set by politicians 
would not be affected by the tax credit. However, much higher oil and corn prices (and prices for 
related crops) give politicians an incentive to increase loan rates compared to a situation of no 
tax credit and lower crop prices with burgeoning taxpayer costs. As shown in Swinnen and de 
Gorter (1998), estimates of the welfare effects of one policy assuming the level of the other 
policy is unaffected can be seriously biased. For example, the recent House Farm Bill proposes 
an increase in loan rates and target prices for several crops. If the tax credit did not exist, ethanol 
and hence corn prices would be lower and tax costs of price contingent subsidies higher. As a 
result, Congress may otherwise have been proposing lower price supports. Hence, the 
counterfactual may be very different so caution should be exercised in attributing the social 
benefits of the tax credit in reducing tax costs of price supports.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
Many countries are implementing a variety of policies to increase biofuel use with 
consumption tax credits being a prominent method amongst them. Hence, it is very important to 
understand the welfare effects of such a policy on the markets for agricultural products, biofuels 
and oil. To this end, this paper develops a unique general theory to analyze the efficiency and 
income distribution effects of a tax credit for biofuels. It is a particularly important issue for 
other countries in the world where gasoline taxes are often far higher than the U.S. case analyzed 
here. Therefore, rectangular deadweight costs can be even higher in these countries.  
Calibrating a stylized model of the U.S. corn-ethanol market, we estimate that rectangular 
deadweight costs averaged $1,520 mil. over the past six years, substantially higher than standard 
Harberger triangles estimated for traditional farm subsidies. We show that a price contingent 
production subsidy for corn like a deficiency payment program can eliminate, create, have no 
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effect or have an ambiguous effect on rectangular deadweight costs. Rectangular deadweight 
costs increase because of the loan rate (as ethanol production expands with a given level of 
water) but at the same time decreases the rectangular deadweight costs as it lowers the water in 
the tax credit for a given level of ethanol production. The outcome depends on whether there is 
ex ante or ex post water in the tax credit. There are situations where corn subsidies have been the 
sole cause of ethanol production (and therefore of rectangular deadweight costs), even with the 
tax credit. Corn producers do not benefit from a tax credit when the subsidy program is in effect.  
Many commentators emphasize the taxpayer savings in farm subsidies with the tax credit. 
This not only ignores the existence of rectangular deadweight costs due to the tax credit but also 
that deficiency payments increase the taxpayer costs of the tax credit. Furthermore, our empirical 
results determine that deficiency payments contribute to the deadweight costs of the tax credit 
and vice-versa, the tax credit increases the deadweight costs of the deficiency payment program. 
Ethanol policies can therefore not be justified on the grounds of mitigating the effects of farm 
subsidy programs.  
Furthermore, we show how the welfare effects of a tax credit depends critically on 
whether the country is a large country importer or exporter in either the agricultural good used in 
biofuel production or oil. For large countries (or for the combined effect of all small countries), 
terms of trade effects in either the oil or the agricultural markets can be positive or negative, 
depending on the trade status in each market. Algebraic expressions for the effects of these and 
other market parameters on the impact of the tax credit on efficiency and transfers are formally 
derived.   
The model presented in this paper allows one to analyze the implications of several other 
policy issues. For example, it is important to understand the impacts of a tax credit on 
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international trade because of the recent controversy over how the U.S. ethanol “subsidy” of 51 
cents per gallon should be treated by the WTO. The model developed in this paper shows the tax 
credit increases the price of both ethanol and corn, thereby conferring no specific subsidy to nor 
harming either producers of ethanol or corn in the rest of the world.20 Only the oil industry can 
be potentially harmed by the subsidy attributed to a consumption tax credit for biofuels.   
The model is also well suited to form a basis for evaluating both the social benefits of the 
tax credit in reducing local pollution, greenhouse gas linked warming and oil dependency and the 
social costs in adding to traffic congestion, accidents and other negative externalities arising 
from more fuel consumption (Parry et al. 2007). Hence, this paper provides a springboard to 
assess the efficacy of alternative policies like a gasoline tax in achieving multiple policy goals 
like reducing oil dependency and tax costs of farm programs, or improving farm incomes and 
environmental quality.   
In future research, the model can be adapted to analyze other interesting issues, like the 
effects of subsidies for either ethanol production or R&D of new technologies, and of policies 
that shift the non-ethanol corn demand curve to the right (import quotas on sugar increases the 
demand for corn syrup) or that shift the corn supply curve left (subsidies for other crops). In 
addition to including more agricultural sectors, future research should also relax some 
assumptions by allowing for decreasing returns to scale in ethanol production, and for 
endogenous biofuel imports and variation in the additive value of ethanol.   
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Figure 1: Market Equilibrium with a Tax Credit  
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               Figure 2: Welfare Economics of a Tax Credit  
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Table 1: Price Contingencies for the Social Welfare Effects of the Tax Credit 
 
CASE A 
[Figures 1,2] 
CASE Ba 
CASE C1 
[Figures 3,4] 
CASE C2 
,c cb NEP t P L+ >  ,NE c cbP P t L> +  ,c cb NEL P t P> +  
Effective 
Producer Price Gasoline market 
drives producer corn 
price 
Gasoline price has 
no effect on corn 
producers 
Loan rate determines supply 
price for corn 
( )( )1 1
c cb
D c cb
P t
q P tπ−
+ >
+  ( )( )1 1
c cb
D NE
P t
q Pπ−
+ <
 ( )( )1 1
c cb
D
P t
q Lπ−
+ >
 ( )( )1 1
c cb
D
P t
q Lπ−
+ <
 
Effective 
Consumer 
Price Gasoline price 
transmits to corn 
consumers 
 
Gasoline price has 
no effect on corn 
consumers 
 
Gasoline 
price 
transmits to 
corn 
consumers 
 
Gasoline price 
has no effect 
on corn 
consumers 
 
a Because there is no ethanol production, there is no link between corn and gasoline prices. 
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Corn If no ethanol No loan rate With loan rate
Dd X E QC QL PC PNE w wL
2001/02 6,877 1,904 721  - 9,502 1.97 1.90 2.03 1.85 1,048 1,195
2002/03 6,402 1,587 977 8,966  - 2.32 2.09 1.85 - 1,398 0
2003/04 6,997 1,899 1,193  - 10,089 2.42 2.18 1.84 1.60 1,715 134
2004/05 8,633 1,818 1,356  - 11,807 2.06 1.96 1.95 1.62 1,920 2,868
2005/06 7,316 2,147 1,649  - 11,112 2.00 1.91 1.97 1.59 2,344 4,300
2006/07 6,401 2,200 2,144 10,745  - 3.04 2.54 1.57 - 3,061 0
average 7,104 1,926 1,340 9,856 10,628 2.30 2.09 1.87 1.67 1,914 1,416
Loan 
rate
Tax credit Deficiency payments
 - - - - - - -  - - - - - - $ per bushel - - - - - - - - - - -   - - - - mil. $  - - - - 
Taxpayer costs 
Ethanol
Prices  'water' in tax credit
 - - - - -- - - - - - - mil. bushels - - -  - - - - - - - -
Table 2: Corn Market Outcomes
Consumption
Domestic 
Non-ethanol Exports
Production at
Market 
price
 
Source: USDA; calculated
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If no LDPs If no tax credit
Total No tax credit Total No tax credit
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
2001/02 49 1.9 919 490 2,243 510 -1,354 141 -420 1,833 -829 -427 -483
2002/03 81 15.1 1,247 1,247 1,398 1,498 0 371 0 1,940 -971 -971 0
2003/04 106 18.9 1,319 1,283 1,849 1,786 -1,804 485 -585 2,500 -959 -1,111 -711
2004/05 161 4.7 1,516 681 4,788 922 -3,101 194 -788 3,918 -1,488 -706 -1,006
2005/06 272 3.4 1,804 599 6,644 713 -3,119 209 -1,137 5,056 -1,870 -635 -1,478
2006/07 445 61.9 2,316 2,316 3,061 3,477 0 1,195 0 4,972 -1,628 -1,628 0
average 186 18 1,520 1,103 3,331 1,484 -1,563 433 -488 3,370 -1,291 -913 -613
Prod. Cons.
Domestic
Total Taxpayers
Rectangular
(effect of tax 
credit)
(effect of 
LDPs)
Triangular
Change in net social welfareTransfers to producers
Consumers 
Foreign
TotalNet gain
Table 3: Transfers and Deadweight Costs of Ethanol Tax Credit and Loan Deficiency Payments ($ mil.)
Deadweight Costs
If tax 
credit only
 
Source: calculated 
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Appendix 
 
The resulting first order conditions can be written 
(A1)
ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 1
ˆ
0
S D X S
D S X
cb
cb cb cb cb cb cb cb
S D X
cb cb cb
P P s q P q P q P q Pq q q t
t t t P t P t P t P t
q P q P q P
P t P t P t
θ
λ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− − − + + − − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂+ − − =⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
% % %
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(A2)
ˆ ˆ ˆ
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S D X S
D D S S
F cb G
c c c c c c c
S X DS D X
G G F
c c c
P q P q P q P P q Pq q t q q
P P P P P P P P P P P
q q qq P q P q Pk
P P P P P P P P P
δ θ
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If either 
ˆ
cb
P
t
∂
∂  or cb
P
t
∂
∂
%
 are non-zero then we can solve (A1) for λ   
 
ˆ ˆ
1 1
ˆ
S
D S X
cb cb cb cb
cbS D X
cb cb cb
P P q Pq q q
t t t P t
t
q P q P q P
P t P t P t
δ θ
λ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− − + − + − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠= +⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− −⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
%
% % . 
 The definitions { }ˆ max , ,c cb NEP P t P L= +  and ( ){ }1 ˆmax , Dc cbP P t q P−= +% , and 
{ }max 0L P, θ = − %  imply the following contingencies: 
 (i) If ,c cb NEP t P L+ > then ˆ c cbP P t= + , c cbP P t= +% , 0θ = , and substituting into (A2) 
obtains  
 
( )
11
S D
D D S S X S D X
F G X X
c
cb S DS X D S D
S D XS X D S D XG G F
G G F X XX X
c c c
q qq q q q q
q q Pt
q qq q q q q
q qP P P q q
η η η
η η ηη η η η η η
⎛ ⎞+ − − + − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ − − −+ − − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
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 (ii) If c cb NEL P t P> + >  or NE c cb LL P P t P> > + >  then Pˆ L= , c cbP P t= +% , c cbL P tθ = − − , 
and substituting into (A2) obtains 
 
( )
11
D
D D S S X D X
F G X
c
cb DS X D D
D XS X D D XG G F
G G F XX
c c c
qq q q q q
q Pt
qq q q q
qP P P q
η η
η ηη η η η η
⎛ ⎞− − + + − − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ − − +− + − − − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
(iii) If NE L c cbL P P P t> > > +  then Pˆ L= , LP P=% , LL Pθ = − .  The tax credit does not 
appear in (A1), hence an optimum obtains when 0cbt = . 
(iv) If ,NE c cbP P t L> + then ˆ NEP P= , NEP P=% , 0θ = .  The tax credit does not appear in 
(A1), hence an optimum obtains when 0cbt = .█ 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Exempted or reduced biofuel excise taxes cover 65 percent of total world fuel consumption and are known to be in 
effect in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, EU, Ghana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Paraguay, 
Philippines, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Uruguay and the United States (Redondo 2007; Kojima et al. 
2007; UNCTAD 2006; Steenblik and Simón 2007; Rothkopf 2007).  To help achieve EU wide biofuel consumption 
targets, 19 Member States have implemented excise tax exemptions and another 5 are planning to do so (EC 2007).  
 
2 The U.S. biofuel tax exemption was changed to a tax credit in 2004 but this was a change in implementation only 
and does not affect the economics of the program. The term “tax credit” is used hereafter in this paper. 
 
3 The import tariff on ethanol is another potential gain in the U.S. terms of trade but we assume ethanol imports are 
exogenous in the model.  The tariff was implemented to offset the benefit exporters would otherwise obtain from the 
higher price of ethanol induced by the tax credit. 
 
4 Although we refer to the U.S. ethanol market as we develop our theory in this paper, it is only an example as the 
model can be applied to any biofuel market with a tax credit.  For small countries, the oil price is fixed and there 
may be no terms of trade effect in the agricultural product market.  Indeed, the effect of U.S. ethanol policy on the 
world price of oil is empirically small for historical levels of ethanol production, even though the United States is a 
large country importer of oil.  
 
5 A key aspect of analyzing the corn-oil market interface is the equilibrium breakeven price of corn. Studies find a 
linear relationship between the corn and oil price (e.g., Tyner 2007; Elobeid et al. 2006).  These estimates of the 
breakeven curve differ, but the slopes are nearly identical.  Linearity suggests that there are constant returns to scale 
in ethanol production.    
  
6 For an analysis of mandates and their interaction effects with tax exemptions, see de Gorter and Just (2007a). 
 
7 For an analysis on the economic effects import tariffs for ethanol, see de Gorter and Just (2007b). 
 
8 The non-ethanol demand curve for corn includes the by-products. For a methodological explanation, see de Gorter 
and Just (2008). 
 
9 Ethanol is a substitute for gasoline derived from petroleum. The term “fuel” in this paper refers to the 
ethanol/gasoline mixture.  Ethanol can be up to 10 percent of the fuel mixture in traditional combustion engines with 
virtually no modifications required.   
 
10 As noted in de Gorter and Just (2008), the tax credit including those by individual states average 56.9¢/gal but we 
ignore this. 
 
11 The tax credit is not adjusted for its energy content and contribution to mileage because consumers are either 
unaware or unable to substitute between E85 and gasoline.  However, with the advent of E85 stations and flex cars, 
this will likely change in the future for the United States (as is the case today in Brazil).  
 
12 In cases where water in the tax credit does not exist, taxpayers would also forego revenues on ethanol that would 
have been produced without the tax credit (in addition to the tax costs of increased ethanol production induced by 
the tax credit that displaces gasoline consumption).  
 
13 World prices of oil decline and as an importer, the United States benefits as a result.  Normally, an optimal import 
tariff is a subsidy on domestic oil production and an equal tax on domestic oil consumption.  Here, the opposite 
occurs with domestic oil production taxed and domestic oil consumption subsidized.  The outcome is unique 
because of the way in which the tax credit affects the ethanol and hence oil markets. 
 
14 Normally an export tax improves a country’s international terms of trade which is a tax on domestic production 
and an equal subsidy on domestic consumption.  In the case evaluated here, the opposite occurs: corn producers are 
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subsidized and domestic non-ethanol corn consumers are taxed because the ethanol tax credit increases the world 
market price for corn. 
 
15 Because U.S. ethanol production in 2006 is estimated to be 0.211 percent of world petroleum consumption, a 
fixed oil price in the empirical analysis is a plausible assumption.   
 
16 The mathematical expression for the effect of the tax credit tc on net tax costs of the loan rate L in Figure 4 is the 
same as for that in Figure 3 but the effect of the loan rate on the net tax costs of the tax credit differs slightly and is 
now given by wL·(QL – CNE). 
 
17 The estimates for deadweight loss triangles are in line with those obtained by Gardner (2003) and Martinez-
Gonzalez et al. (2007) but these studies omit rectangular deadweight costs. 
 
18 The United States could easily obtain the terms of trade improvements by restricting exports instead and not 
having the tax credit, saving both rectangular deadweight costs and increased costs to domestic consumers. 
 
19 Annual average costs of the tax credit were $1,914 mil while that of the loan rate was $1,416 mil. (Table 2). 
   
20 Nevertheless, the United States notifies the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in the WTO of 
the revenues foregone with the biofuel tax credit as a subsidy but categorizes it as an industrial product (IPC 2006).  
In regards to the recent case filed with the WTO on U.S. farm subsidies, Brazil argues the biofuel subsidy should be 
included in the domestic support disciplines of the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture but the U.S. response was “the 
case is about agriculture, not ethanol” (GMF 2007).  Either way, our model shows that the tax credit would not 
constitute a specific subsidy nor have adverse effects on ethanol, corn or sugar producers in the rest of the world. 
Brazil should instead focus on the U.S.’s 54¢/gal import tariff on ethanol that prevents Brazil from taking advantage 
of this increase in ethanol price.  The elimination of the so-called “subsidy” due to the tax credit while maintaining 
the import tariff would make things even worse for Brazil.  
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